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ABSTRACT
The present study focused on the nature of the reading disability of children with the guessing subtype of
dyslexia (who read fast and inaccurately). The objective was to separate the excitatory account of their
reading disturbance (i.e., in guessers the words’ resting levels of activation are oversensitive to semantic
context) from the inhibitory account (i.e., guessers tend to react prematurely to (false) candidate words that
are activated in the lexicon).
To disentangle the above accounts, guessers and normal readers were presented with a sentential priming
task (SPT). In the SPT, subjects had to determine whether the final word of a sentence was semantically
congruent or incongruent with the sentence, but had to inhibit their ‘congruent’ or ‘incongruent’ response in
case of an occasionally presented pseudoword. To evoke guessing, each pseudoword closely resembled
either a valid congruent or incongruent word. Guessing referred to prematurely accepting a pseudoword as a
word that either appropriately or inappropriately completed the sentence. The extent to which subjects
guessed at word meaning was evidenced by the false recognition rates (FRR) of the misspelled terminal
words.
Analyses on the FRRs of the pseudowords showed that guessers had significantly more difficulty in
suppressing the ‘go tendency’ triggered by the pseudowords. It was concluded that the impulsive reading
style of guessers should be ascribed to a less efficient suppression mechanism rather than to excessive
reliance on contextual information. Specifically, the data were explained by assuming that the availability of
the pseudoword’s candidate meaning activated the hand to respond with, and that guessers found difficulty in
suspending this response until they analyzed all letters in the stimulus and they could be sure of its spelling.
INTRODUCTION
Studies have shown that children with dyslexia
represent a heterogeneous group comprising sev-
eral subgroups (Satz & Morris, 1981). Although
the notion of subtypes is widely accepted, the
manner in which subgroups are identified varies.
For example, each of the studies listed by Hooper
and Willis (1989, pp. 42–44) used different
measures of achievement and cognition as the
basis for group separation. In spite of this, Van der
Schoot, Licht, Horsley, and Sergeant (2000, 2002)
argued that the different subgroups that have been
distinguished by several of the dual-subtype
models – for example, Bakker’s L and P type
(1981, 1992); Van der Leij’s guessers and spellers
type (1983); Boder’s dysphonetic and dyseidetic
readers (1970, 1973); Lovett’s accuracy and rate
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disabled readers (1984) and Mitterer’s whole-
word and recoding subtypes (1982) – largely
overlap and, in view of their reading style, seem to
converge to two types of dyslexic children. The
first type, henceforth referred to as guesser,
manifests a fast and global reading style that is
characterized by many substantive errors. Sub-
stantive errors are omissions, additions, substitu-
tions, letter reversals, false word identifications
(i.e., misreading one word as another) and other
word mutilating errors that result in an inaccurate
reading response. The second type, henceforth
referred to as speller, reads slow and fragment-
edly. In this subgroup of dyslexic children the
identification of words is mainly based on an
elaborate grapheme to phoneme translation pro-
cess. Yet, the speller’s style of reading is accurate
in that it leaves the ultimate reading response
intact.
At the word recognition level, the slow-
accurate–fast-inaccurate dichotomy has been
associated with indirect- versus direct-word
approach (e.g., Licht, 1989; Van Strien, Bouma,
& Bakker, 1993). In the indirect or phonological
route, word identification is attained through gen-
eration of a phonological representation, formed
by the stepwise translation of graphemes into
phonemes. The direct or lexical route does not
require an intermediate phonological code, since
the use of specific orthographic codes enables di-
rect access to word memory. Licht (1989), Licht
and Van Onna (1995),Van der Leij (1983), and Van
Strien et al. (1993) argued that guessers and
spellers may predominantly rely on the direct and
indirect word recognition strategy, respectively.
Clearly, the distinction between guessers and
spellers differs from the classical distinction
between developmental phonological and surface
dyslexia (e.g., Castles & Coltheart, 1993;
Stanovich, Siegel, & Gottardo, 1997). Whereas
the former distinction refers to differences in
reading style (fast-direct vs. slow-indirect), the
latter distinction refers to differences in deficits
underlying word recognition problems (phonolo-
gical vs. visuo-orthographical deficits). Yet, spel-
lers may be equated with surface dyslexics in that
they are presumed to have difficulties using visuo-
orthographic cues for fast whole word recognition
(as a consequence of which they have to employ a
spelling-like approach). Guessers on the other
hand, cannot be so easily equated with phonolo-
gical dyslexics. Although guessers show a num-
ber of reading characteristics that are similar to
the phonological dyslexia subtype, their fast,
hasty reading style is not easy to explain.
Reading and Executive Function
Van der Schoot et al. (2000) suggested that dif-
ferences between guessers and spellers do not
necessarily have to boil down to differences in
computational skills required for efficient word
recognition, and that the field of executive
functioning (EF) may be a promising alternative
for determining the underlying process deficit(s)
in guessers and (possibly) spellers. There is a
growing body of evidence that specific patterns of
executive deficits exist in (subtypes of) dyslexic
children. These deficits were reflected by poor
response inhibition (Purvis & Tannock, 2000),
poor flexibility of responding (Helland &
Asbjornsen, 2000), poor inhibition of distractors
and sequencing of events (Brosnan et al., 2002),
increased Stroop interference (Evarett, Warner,
Miles, & Thomsen, 1997), planning and organiza-
tional problems (Condor, Anderson, & Saling,
1995; Levin, 1990) and difficulties in selective
and sustained attention (Kelly, Best, & Kirk,
1989). To explore the possibility that the impul-
sive reading style of guessers is linked to deficits
in more basic executive processes responsible for
the regulation of behavior, Van der Schoot et al.
(2000) compared children with the guessing type
of dyslexia with children with the spelling type of
dyslexia on three aspects of executive functioning
(EF): response inhibition, interference control,
and planning. In agreement with the predictions,
guessers were found to be impaired in their ability
to inhibit inappropriate responding on all tasks
that were used to assess the different EF mea-
sures, that is the stop signal task (Logan &
Cowan, 1984), the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), and
the Tower of London task (Shallice, 1982),
respectively. In a subsequent study in which
event-related brain potentials (ERPs) were re-
corded during stop task performance, Van der
Schoot et al. (2002) provided evidence that the
inhibitory deficits in guessers can be attributed to
dysfunctions in the fronto-central brain areas.
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The crucial question that was raised by the Van
der Schoot et al. (2000, 2002) studies was whether
the executive-type deficiencies observed in gues-
sers may also underlie their impulsive reading
behaviors or that primarily a language-based dis-
order has to be assumed. Since the EF tasks did
not tap critical elements of reading, no direct
relationship between the guessers’ executive dys-
functions and reading disturbance could be
deduced from both experiments. However, the
finding that fast-inaccurate readers can be differ-
entiated from slow-accurate readers and normal
readers on a variety of EF tasks, as well as the
finding that the guessers’ impairment in executive
functioning is apparent not only behaviorally but
also electrophysiologically, suggest that there is at
least some type of association between them.
To further examine the nature of the associa-
tion between the guessers’ impulsive reading style
and their executive deficits, Van der Schoot et al.
(submitted) assessed the role of inhibitory control
in a combined semantic categorization/lexical
decision task (SCT). In the SCT subjects had to
determine whether a word belonged to either of
two semantic categories, but had to inhibit their
response in case of an occasionally presented
pseudoword (i.e., a nonword that is orthographi-
cally legal). To evoke guessing, each pseudoword
closely resembled a valid category member.
Guessing referred to prematurely accepting a
pseudoword as a word, that is making a response
with respect to the meaning of the letter string
before all letters have been analyzed. Analyses on
the false recognition rates of the pseudowords
showed that guessers had significantly more diffi-
culty in suppressing the ‘go tendency’ triggered
by pseudowords than normal readers. It was
concluded that the early availability of the pseu-
doword’s candidate meaning activated the hand
to respond with, and that guessers found difficulty
in suspending this response until they analyzed all
letters in the stimulus and they could be sure of its
spelling.
Logogen-Type Lexical Activation
For present purposes, it is important to recognize
that the above account of the guessers’ reading
disturbance differed from Van der Schoot et al.’s
original hypothesis but did not invalidate it. Their
original hypothesis was derived from a logogen-
type lexical activation model (e.g., Coltheart,
Curtis, Atkins, & Haller, 1993; Coltheart, Rastle,
Perry, Langdon, & Ziegler, 2001). Logogen-type
lexical activation models share the conception of
recognition units, or input logogens, which collect
and sum evidence from sensory stimulation. Each
of the input logogens corresponds to a word in the
orthographic lexicon. This implies that the pre-
sentation of a target word induces the simultaneous
activation of a set of lexical candidates, that is
words that have sufficient orthographic features in
common with the stimulus word. In logogen
systems that operate in a cascaded fashion, these
partial activations of words and word units in the
orthographic lexicon (i.e., the Input Logogen
System) cascade forward to the corresponding
semantic codes in the semantic lexicon (i.e., the
Cognitive System) and the corresponding pho-
neme units in the phonological lexicon (i.e., the
Output Logogen System) (e.g., Coltheart et al.,
1993). During the course of analyzing a word,
partial graphemic information may therefore
activate candidate meanings and candidate pro-
nunciations. Logogen-type lexical activation mod-
els assume that the resting activation levels of the
words’ logogens are temporarily responsive to
semantic context (e.g., Coltheart et al., 2001;
Morton, 1982). For example, the ‘starting point’
for the lexical unit EAT would be heightened after
the presentation of the words THE PIZZA IS TOO
HOT TO rather than after THE PACKAGE IS TOO
HEAVY TO. This way, these models account for the
most famous empirical phenomenon of word
recognition: the contextual facilitation/semantic
priming effect (see Neely, 1991, for a review).
Van der Schoot et al. (submitted) reasoned that
information-collecting units with tunable resting
levels of activation may account for the guessers’
impulsive reading style if one assumes that in
guessers, the resting activation levels of logo-
gens are overresponsive to semantic constraints.
According to cascaded logogen-type lexical
activation models, words whose logogens are
highly activated at the moment of presentation
require only a small amount of sensory informa-
tion in order to induce activity at the semantic and
phonological level. This may have inflated the
guessers’ false recognition rate in the SCT if one
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assumes that activated candidate meanings
primed the hand to respond with, and that
guessers found difficulty in suspending this re-
sponse until they analyzed all letters in the
stimulus and they could be sure of its spelling.
Unfortunately, the extent to which this was
actually the case could not be inferred from the
Van der Schoot et al. study. Therefore, it should be
further investigated whether the guessers’ reading
disturbance can be attributed to logogens that are
oversensitive to semantic context, to a less
efficient suppression mechanism, or to a combi-
nation of both.
The Present Study
In the present study, an attempt will be made to
disentangle the above accounts by means of a
sentential priming task (SPT). In the SPT, the
subject had to decide whether a word was
semantically congruent or semantically incon-
gruent in a particular sentence context. However,
subjects had to inhibit their response in case of an
occasionally presented pseudoword. Each pseu-
doword closely resembled either a valid con-
gruent word or a valid incongruent word. Due to
this procedure, subjects were provoked to guess at
word meaning, whereby guessing refers to pre-
maturely accepting a pseudoword as a word that
either appropriately or inappropriately completes
the sentence. The extent to which subjects guess
at word meaning is evidenced by the false
recognition rate (FRR) of the misspelled terminal
words.
It is presumed that in the SPT, the availability
of the candidate meaning of a (pseudo)word
activates the hand to respond with and that, in
order to perform the task properly, subjects were
required to inhibit, or delay, the selected response
until all letters in the stimulus were analyzed. It is
predicted that (1) congruent words would yield a
faster mean reaction time (RT) than incongruent
words, that (2) congruent pseudowords would
yield a higher false recognition rate (FRR) than
incongruent pseudowords, and that (3) congruent
pseudowords would yield false recognition times
(FRTs) that are at least as fast as the RTs to
congruent words but faster than the FRTs to
incongruent pseudowords. These predictions
directly follow from the notion that the logogens
of words that are related to a semantic context
have higher ‘starting points’ than the logogens of
words that are unrelated to a semantic context. In
order to retrieve a word’s meaning from the
semantic lexicon (i.e., Cognitive System) and
make a decision with respect to its semantic
appropriateness, subjects therefore needed to
extract a smaller number of sensory attributes
from a congruent terminal word than from an
incongruent terminal word (prediction 1). At the
same time, however, this increased the probability
that the orthographic features of a slightly mis-
spelled congruent word would provide this lim-
ited number and induce a false recognition error
(prediction 2 and 3).
It should be noted that the way in which
logogen-type lexical activation models account
for the above type of semantic context effects is
highly similar to the way in which a class of
models referred to as automatic spreading-activa-
tion models account for them (e.g., Anaki &
Henik, 2003; Collins & Loftus, 1975; Hill, Strube,
Roesch, & Weisbrod, 2002). According to the
spreading activation theory, concepts are repre-
sented by locations (i.e., nodes) in a semantic
memory network. It is assumed that, when stimu-
lus information activates a memory location,
some of the activation automatically spreads to
semantically related memory locations that are
nearby in the network. The process of automatic
spreading-activation and the process of logogen
activation do not use attentional capacity and do
not affect the retrieval of information that is
unrelated to the context.
The primary focus of the present experiment
concerns the Congruency (congruent pseudo-
words vs. incongruent pseudowords) by Group
(guessers vs. normal readers) interaction, since
the nature of this interaction provides information
regarding the relative contributions of the excit-
atory account (i.e., guessers have logogens whose
activation levels are oversensitive to semantic
context) and inhibitory account (i.e., guessers
tend to react prematurely to (false) candidate
words) of the guessers’ reading disturbance. To
understand this, it should be recognized that the
orthographic structure of both congruent and
incongruent pseudowords would bias the subjects
towards one word in particular, and that false
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recognition errors to both types of pseudowords
are expected to result from a failure to suppress
the hand response that became activated as soon
as the candidate meaning was extracted from the
pseudoword. Since guessers are presumed to
suffer from a less efficient response suppression
mechanism, it is predicted that congruent pseudo-
words and incongruent pseudowords would
induce more false recognition errors in guessers
than in normal readers. In the congruent pseudo-
word condition, however, false recognition errors
are not only hypothesized to result from ortho-
graphic priming (i.e., priming by the orthographic
appearance of the word) but also from sentential
priming (i.e., priming by the sentence context;
prediction 2). Since the sentence context is pre-
sumed to over-facilitate lexical decisions on con-
gruent pseudowords in guessers, the interaction
between Congruency and Group is predicted to be
overadditive. That is, the difference between the
FRR in guessers and the FRR in normal readers
should be larger for congruent pseudowords than
for incongruent pseudowords.1 Assuming that the
guessers’ impaired inhibitory abilities equally
affected the performance on congruent and incon-
gruent pseudowords, the residual group difference
in the FRR to congruent pseudowords would then
reflect the extent to which the resting activation
levels of (the logogens of) words are more respon-
sive to contextual constraints in guessers than in
normal readers. On the other hand, the notion of
overresponsive logogens would be invalidated if
the difference between the FRR in guessers and
the FRR in normal readers was to be found as
large in the congruent pseudoword condition as
the incongruent pseudoword condition.
METHOD
Subjects
Subjects were 10–12-year-old children who were
recruited from two special schools for learning disabled
children and from one normal primary school. Learning
disabled children whose reading disturbance could
be attributed to emotional problems, socio-cultural
factors or gross neurological deficits on the basis of
school records, were not included in the sample.
All children who participated (N¼ 65 for reading
disabled and N¼ 16 for controls) were healthy and
had normal or corrected to normal vision, and their IQ
scores (obtained from school records) were in the
normal range (IQ> 85). None of the children was
diagnosed as ADHD using DSM-IV criteria (American
Psychiatric Association, 1994), nor did they participate
(or had been participating) in ADHD treatment
programmes.
Assessment of Dyslexia
To assess current reading level, all children were ad-
ministered a standardized Dutch word-reading test
(Two-Minutes-Test (TMT); Brus & Voeten, 1973)
which consists of lists of words that become progres-
sively more difficult. The TMT score, the number of
words read correctly in two minutes, was converted into
a reading-age equivalent (RAE; Struiksma, Van der
Leij, & Vieijra, 1989) reflecting the child’s actual
reading level expressed in the number of months of
reading instruction (one year of instruction being
equivalent to 10 months). The expected reading-age
(ERA) is equivalent to the number of months that a
child has received formal reading instruction. Since in
The Netherlands a very systematic way of reading
instruction is employed, the ERA-RAE difference
enabled us to assess lag of reading performance almost
at the level of a month. Children who lagged 15 months
or more in reading (ERA-RAE) were considered to be
dyslexic (N¼ 62, 3 learning disabled children did not
fulfill this criterion and were removed from the
sample). Consequently, only those children were ad-
mitted to the subsequent classification procedure.
The ERA-RAE procedure goes beyond a simplistic
chronological age-grade level discrepancy formula in
that the number of months of actual reading instruction,
and not chronological age, is used to define reading lag.
In addition, the educational age-norms for average
reading level were obtained in extensive standardiza-
tion studies on reading in the Dutch population of
primary school children.
All of the control children (N¼ 16) came from the
normal primary school and their RAEs approximated
their ERAs.
Classification of Guessers
Subsequent to the TMT, the dyslexic children were
given a standardized Dutch sentence-reading test (AVI;
Van den Berg & Te Lintelo, 1977). This test consists of
nine texts with increasing difficulty. The number of
1In addition, the guessers’ mean RT to congruent words
is predicted to be faster than the normal readers’ mean
RT to congruent words since it is thought to be
composed of a relatively large number of ‘lucky
guesses’.
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texts actually mastered (i.e., read within time and error
limits) determines the child’s mastery level of text
reading.
The AVI was employed to classify the dyslexics as
guessers on the basis of reading speed, the number of
substantive errors (SE; e.g., omissions, additions,
substitutions, letter reversals) and the number of time-
consuming errors (TE; e.g., hesitations, stammerings,
fragmentations, repetitions, corrections). In order to
evoke a sufficient number of SE and TE errors, a text
two levels above the child’s mastery level was
presented and assessed on reading speed and reading
errors.
Reading speed (RS) was expressed as the total
reading time divided by the time norm for the text  100,
whereas reading error (RE) was expressed as the
proportion of SE errors relative to the total number of
errors (SEþTE). A child was classified as having the
guessing type of dyslexia when: RS< 120 and RE>
0.60 (more than 60% of errors made were substantive
errors). The classification criteria were adapted from
Bakker and Vinke (1985) and Van Strien, Bakker,
Bouma, and Koops (1990) and have been applied in
many studies (e.g., Jonkman, Licht, Bakker, & Van den
Broek-Sandmann, 1992; Patel & Licht, 2000; Van
Strien, 1999). Using this classification system, we were
able to classify about 26% of our dyslexics as guessers
(N¼ 16).
To assess hand preference (i.e., the characteristic
preference that individuals show for one or the other
hand for performing unimanual tasks), the children
were rated with a hand preference questionnaire (Van
Strien, 1992; scale ranges from 10 (left-handed) to
þ10 (right handed).
Group characteristics are presented in Table 1. Note.
t tests showed that guessers and controls neither differ
in age, t(30)¼ 1.70, nor in handedness, t(30)¼ 0.14.
Task and Stimuli
In the Sentential Priming Task (SPT), the child had to
determine whether the final word of a sentence was
semantically congruent or semantically incongruent
with the rest of the sentence. For example, THE PIZZA IS
TOO HOT TO . . . EAT would require a response with the
left hand, and THE PIZZA IS TOO HOT TO . . .WALK would
require a response with the right hand. However,
subjects had to inhibit their response in case of an
occasionally presented pseudoword. To evoke ‘guess-
ing’, each pseudoword closely resembled either a valid
congruent word or a valid incongruent word. In the
congruent pseudoword condition, this means that the
pseudoword was derived from the anticipated terminal
word, that is the word that would harmonize with the
unfinished sentence (e.g., JOHN EATS HIS SOUP WITH
A . . . SPOOM). In the incongruent pseudoword condition,
the pseudoword was a slightly misspelled version of a
word that would be incongruent with the sentence (e.g.,
JOHN EATS HIS SOUP WITH A . . . ROBIM).
Both congruent pseudowords and incongruent pseu-
dowords were constructed by changing only a single
letter in a word. The deviant letter always occurred in the
last segment of the pseudoword. We ascertained that
the resulting letter strings were in conformance with the
orthography of the Dutch language, so that decisions
about lexicality had to be based on retrieval of lexical
information rather than on shallower, that is nonlexical,
criteria (e.g., illegal orthography).
The words from which the congruent and incon-
gruent pseudowords were derived, were familiar 4–10
letter words. According to the Staphorsius–Krom–de
Geus (1988) frequency list of word forms and letter
positions (corpus size: 202,526; Staphorsius–Krom–de
Geus, 1988), the average frequency of the words from
which the congruent pseudowords were derived was
16.4, and the average frequency of the words from
Table 1. Characteristics for Each Reading Group.
N Age Hand Reading ageb Reading Error
(boys/girls) preferencea
Expected Actual Difference
speedc
(on AVI)
typed
(on AVI)
Guessers 16 (9/7) 11.9 (0.6) 7.1 (5.4) 54.8 (4.8) 26.9 (3.3) 27.9 (6.7) 98.5 (8.8) .66 (.06)
Controls 16 (6/10) 11.5 (0.7) 7.3 (4.9) 52.7 (5.2) 48.6 (6.8) 4.1 (9.1) – –
Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
aHand preference is rated on a scale ranging from 10 (left-handed) to þ10 (right-handed) (Van Strien,
1992).
bReading age is in months; 10 months equals 1 year of reading instruction. (The actual reading age is derived
from the Two-Minutes-Test (TMT; Brus & Voeten, 1973)).
cReading speed is expressed as 100  (time needed/time norm).
dError type is expressed as N(substantive errors)/N(substantiveþ time-consuming errors).
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which the incongruent pseudowords were derived was
14.4. This difference in word familiarity was not
significant, t(79)¼ 0.44. In addition, congruent and in-
congruent pseudowords did not differ in their averaged
length (6.7 vs. 7.0 letters, respectively; t(79)¼ 1.20).
The sentences ranged in length from 3 to 7 words and
were of the type ‘<subject> <verb> <direct/
indirect object> ’.
In the SPT, each trial began with the presentation of
the incomplete sentence, which was displayed for
2500 ms. Following the offset of the incomplete sen-
tence, there was a 500 ms interstimulus interval to the
onset of the terminal word/pseudoword. The word/
pseudoword was displayed for 800 ms and immediately
followed by a 300-ms masking stimulus (an ‘######’
array). After the mask signal, the screen was blank for a
2100 ms intertrial interval. A pilot study showed that a
800 ms stimulus duration was sufficiently long to
recognize the word stimulus.
The unfinished sentences and the terminal words/
pseudowords were presented in black-on-white and in
the center of the screen. They were printed in lowercase
letters with a 1.80 cm width and a 2.90 cm height.
Design and Procedure
In the SPT, a total of four test blocks of 200 trials each
were administered. After each block, a short break was
scheduled. Prior to the first test block, the subjects were
provided with 28 practice trials. Approximately, the
SPT lasted 2 hr. After the experiment, the subjects
received a present for their participation.
Terminal words requiring a Go response were
presented on 80% of the trials: 40% of the words were
congruent with the sentence and required a response
with the left hand (CW condition, 320 trials), and 40%
of the words were incongruent with the sentence and
required a response with the right hand (IW condition,
320 trials). Terminal pseudowords requiring a NoGo
response were presented on 20% of the trials: 10% of
the pseudowords were derived from a congruent word
(CP condition, 80 trials), and 10% of the pseudowords
were derived from an incongruent word (IP condition,
80 trials).
The sequence of congruent words, incongruent
words, congruent pseudowords and incongruent pseu-
dowords was pseudo-randomized, and mapping of
congruent and incongruent words onto response hand
was counterbalanced across subjects.
Subjects were instructed to make a left hand re-
sponse to terminal words that were congruent with the
sentence and to make a right hand response to terminal
words that were incongruent with the sentence. They
were told to respond as quickly and as accurately as
possible. After the Go task instructions, the NoGo task
instruction was given. The subjects were explicitly
instructed to withhold their response whenever the
stimulus item was a nonexisting meaningless word (i.e.,
a pseudoword).
Apparatus
The stimuli were presented on a NEC Multisync 5FG
monitor positioned at 70.00 cm from the subject’s eyes.
Subjects sat in a reclining chair. On either side of the
bed a response box was positioned at an optimal loca-
tion for each subject.
Data Analysis
Go Words
For each word type (congruent words vs. incongruent
words) and subject group (guessers vs. normal readers),
the following dependent measures were derived from
the Go trials: mean reaction time (RT), standard
deviation of RT (SD), percentage of errors (responding
‘congruent’ when an incongruent word was presented,
or vice versa), and percentage of omissions (non-
responses). The effects of ‘Congruency’ and ‘Group’
on the different dependent variables were examined in
repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVA),
using an alpha level of 0.05.
NoGo Pseudowords
For each pseudoword type (congruent pseudowords vs.
incongruent pseudowords) and subject group (guessers
vs. normal readers), the percentage of false alarms
(%FA), the percentage of hand errors (%HE), and the
false alarm reaction times (FA-RTs) were computed.
Subjects make a false alarm error when they respond
‘congruent’ to a congruent pseudoword, or when they
respond ‘incongruent’ to an incongruent pseudoword.
Subjects make a hand error when they respond ‘con-
gruent’ to an incongruent pseudoword, or when they
respond ‘incongruent’ to a congruent pseudoword. The
focus of the present experiment is on the false alarm rates
(i.e., false recognition rates (FRRs)) since they are
believed to reflect the extent to which subjects guess at
word meaning. As already pointed out, guessing refers to
prematurely accepting a pseudoword as a word that either
appropriately or inappropriately completes the sentence.
The effects of ‘Congruency’ and ‘Group’ on the
different dependent variables were examined in re-
peated measures ANOVA, using an alpha level of 0.05.
RESULTS
Go Words
Analyses of variance with one between-subject
factor (Group: guessers vs. controls) and one
INHIBITORY CONTROL DURING SENTENCE READING 179
within-subject factor (Congruency: congruent vs.
incongruent) was conducted for the mean reaction
time to the Go words (RT), the standard deviation
of RT (SD), the percentage of errors, and the
percentage of omissions.
With respect to RT, the result of the analysis of
variance showed a main effect of Congruency,
F(1, 30)¼ 59.97, p< .001, signifying that con-
gruent words yielded shorter reaction times than
incongruent words. In both the congruent word
condition and incongruent word condition, guess-
ers were as fast as controls (Group effect:
F(1, 30)¼ 0.01, p¼ .90; GroupCongruency:
F(1, 30)¼ 0.00, p¼ .97). Yet, guessers tended to
be more variable in responding than controls (SD
effect: F(1, 30)¼ 2.96, p< .1, 2p ¼ 0.09).
Significant Group effects were obtained for
percentage of errors (F(1, 30)¼ 17.31, p< .001;
guessers made more hand errors than controls)
and percentage of omissions (F(1, 30)¼ 5.35,
p< .05; guessers made more omission errors than
controls). In both subject groups, congruent words
brought about more hand errors and fewer omission
errors than incongruent words (F(1, 30)¼ 32.94,
p< .001 and F(1, 30)¼ 28.40, p< .001, respec-
tively). As for the hand errors, the effect of Con-
gruency was larger in guessers than in controls, as
was reflected in the significant Group by Con-
gruency interaction, F(1, 30)¼ 6.16, p< .05.
Means and standard deviations of the depen-
dent measures in each reading group are pre-
sented in Table 2.
NoGo Pseudowords
The mean percentages of false alarms (FA) and
hand errors (HE) for congruent pseudowords (CP)
and incongruent pseudowords (IP) in each subject
group are displayed in Figure 1.
On the percentages of false alarms, a 2 (Group:
guessers vs. controls)  2 (Congruency: CP vs.
IP) ANOVA was performed, treating Group as
between-subject variable and Congruency as
within-subject variable. The results of this
analysis demonstrated a main effect of Group
(F(1, 30)¼ 32.96, p< .001) and Congruency
(F(1, 30)¼ 103.65, p< .001), signifying that
guessers misidentified pseudowords as words
more often than controls, and that incongruent
pseudowords induced more false word recogni-
tions than congruent pseudowords. Although the
group difference in false alarm rate was larger in
the IP condition (average increase of 39%) than in
the CP condition (average increase of 28%) the
interaction between Group and Congruency did
not reach conventional levels of significance,
F(1, 30)¼ 2.75.
In order to compare the false alarm rates with
the hand error rates, we repeated the above anal-
ysis with Error_Type (FA vs. HE) as additional
within-subject variable. Pseudowords induced
more false alarms than hand errors (Error_Type:
F(1, 30)¼ 197.42, p< .001), and, when averaged
across levels of Congruency, the group difference
in false alarm rate was larger than the group
difference in the hand error rate (GroupError_
Type: F(1, 30)¼ 23.35, p< .001). In both reading
groups congruent pseudowords induced more
hand errors than incongruent pseudowords, and
the difference between false alarm rate and hand
error rate was particularly manifest in the incon-
gruent pseudoword condition (Error_Type by
Congruency: F(1, 30)¼ 81.51, p< .001).
Table 2. Performance on the ‘Go’ words in the Sentential Priming Task (SPT).
Congruent words Incongruent words
Controls Guessers Controls Guessers
M SD M SD M SD M SD
RT (Go words) 957.97 281.57 969.33 324.87 1154.33 295.65 1167.72 280.11
SD of RT 302.82 88.14 349.73 80.65 291.73 87.56 341.28 76.99
% of errors 5.35 4.32 14.18 7.94 2.47 1.79 6.91 4.64
% of omissions 1.18 1.04 5.91 7.57 3.10 1.89 7.77 8.61
Note. M¼mean, SD¼ standard deviation, RT¼mean reaction time to Go words; all times are in ms.
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Along with the correct response times to the
correctly spelled words, the false alarm-reaction
times (FA-RTs) and hand error-reaction times
(HE-RTs) to congruent pseudowords and incon-
gruent pseudowords are displayed in Figure 2.
As can be seen from Figure 2, the difference
between mean FA-RT and mean RT varied as a
function of Congruency. Whereas incongruent
pseudowords and incongruent words yielded
similar response times, the false recognition
Fig. 1. The mean percentages of false alarms (%FA) and hand errors (%HE) for congruent pseudowords and
incongruent pseudowords in controls and guessers.
Fig. 2. The correct reaction times to congruent and incongruent words, and the false alarm and hand error reaction
times to congruent and incongruent pseudowords (RT¼ reaction time).
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times to congruent pseudowords were slower than
the correct recognition times to congruent words.
This effect was reflected in the significant Con-
gruency by Response_Type interaction, F(1, 30)¼
6.99, p< .05, in an analysis of variance with
Group as the between-subject factor and Con-
gruency (CP vs. IP) and Response_Type (RT
vs. FA-RT) as within-subject factors. The ef-
fect was manifest in both guessers and normal
readers (GroupCongruencyResponse_Type:
F(1, 30)¼ 1.22). From Figure 2, it can be seen
that incongruent pseudowords evoked compar-
able FA-RTs in guessers and in controls, but that
congruent pseudowords evoked shorter FA-RTs in
guessers than in controls. However, a post hoc
analysis conducted on the FA-RTs showed that
the interaction between Group and Congruency
did not reach conventional levels of significance,
F(1, 30)¼ 1.36.
The reaction times that accompanied the hand
errors (HE-RTs) were slower than the correct RTs
and FA-RTs in both the CP condition and the IP
condition. This combined effect was reflected in
the significant Congruency by Response_Type
interaction, F(2, 30)¼ 3.56, p< .05 in an analysis
of variance with Group as between-subject factor
and Congruency (CP vs. IP) and Response_Type
(three levels: RTs vs. FA-RTs vs. HE-RTs)2 as
within-subject factors. The effect was apparent in
both guessers and controls.
DISCUSSION
The main objective of the present study was to
explain the fast and inaccurate reading style of
children with the guessing type of dyslexia. The
inhibitory account of their reading disturbance
asserts that guessers tend to react prematurely to
(false) candidate words that are activated in the
lexicon. The excitatory account of their reading
disturbance claims that in guessers, the (logogens
of) words have activation levels that are over-
sensitive to semantic context.
In order to disentangle the accounts, guessers
and normal readers were presented with a senten-
tial priming task (SPT). In the SPT, subjects had
to determine whether the final word of a sentence
was semantically congruent or incongruent with
the sentence, but had to inhibit their ‘congruent’
or ‘incongruent’ response in case of an occasion-
ally presented pseudoword. To evoke guessing,
each pseudoword closely resembled either a valid
congruent or incongruent word. In the evaluation
of the results, the effects of congruency on reac-
tion time (in case the stimulus was a word) and
false recognition rate/false recognition time (in
case the stimulus was a pseudoword) will be
discussed first. Then, the effects of group on the
dependent variables will be discussed. These
effects will be evaluated both separately and in
combination with the congruency factor.
The effects of congruency on RT, FRR and
FRT are not easy to explain. As predicted by a
logogen-style activation framework, congruent
words yielded shorter RTs than incongruent
words. This finding can be accounted for by
assuming that words that are related to a semantic
context have higher ‘starting points’ than words
that are unrelated to a semantic context (Coltheart
et al., 2001; Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1976;
Morton, 1982). In order to make a decision with
respect to a word’s semantic appropriateness and
lexical status, subjects therefore needed to extract
a smaller number of sensory features from a
congruent word than from an incongruent word.
However, this line of reasoning also predicts that
the orthographic features of a slightly misspelled
congruent word are more likely to provide this
limited number than a slightly misspelled version
of an incongruent word. Hence, congruent pseu-
dowords were predicted to produce more and
faster false word recognitions than incongruent
pseudowords. In addition, the false recognition
times to slightly misspelled congruent words (i.e.,
congruent pseudowords) were predicted be as fast
as the correct recognition times to correctly
spelled congruent words. Clearly, the FRR/FRT
data contradict these predictions, since congruent
pseudowords produced fewer false word recogni-
tions than incongruent pseudowords and pro-
duced false recognition times that were slower
than the correct recognitions times to congruent
2It should be noted that in the IP condition, 12 control
children and 3 guessers made no hand errors, as a
consequence of which the average HE-RTs were based
on only 4 and 13 subjects, respectively.
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words and, in controls, the false recognition times
to incongruent pseudowords.
Expectancy-Based Semantic Priming
Together, the data suggest the operation of a
semantic priming mechanism other than the one
described above. A post hoc explanation that may
be more compatible with the results is that – in
addition to automatic processes – priming has
also come about due to strategic processes
mediating expectancies (see Anderson, 1983;
Becker, 1980, 1985; Brown, Hagoort, & Chwilla,
2000; Posner & Snyder, 1975; Stanovich & West,
1979, 1981). Unlike the automatic priming
mechanism, the expectancy mechanism acts slow
and requires a person’s conscious attention. The
expectancy theory asserts that subjects who are
engaged in a single-word semantic priming
paradigm (e.g., Neely, 1977) or sentential priming
paradigm (e.g., Stanovich & West, 1983) use the
word-prime/sentence-prime to prepare them-
selves for the most likely target. They do so by
directing a limited-capacity processor to the
memory location of the expected stimulus.
Significantly, this mechanism ‘inhibits the retriev-
al of information from unexpected locations
because the limited-capacity processor must be
shifted to a location some distance away in the
memory network so that information can be read
out’ (Stanovich & West, 1979, p. 78). Since in the
present experiment the incomplete sentences
were highly predictive of the target word, it is
likely that the expectancy mechanism became
implicated in the subjects’ performance.3
Congruent and Incongruent
Word Condition
It is presumed that, in the congruent word
condition, the expectancy mechanism facilitated
performance on all trials on which the actual
target matched the expected target. In the in-
congruent word condition, the expectancy mech-
anism caused an inhibitory effect as the limited-
capacity processor had to be moved from the
expected location in the semantic memory net-
work to the location of the unexpected target. The
operation of these controlled processes mediating
expectancies are reflected in the RT difference
between congruent words (short RT) and incon-
gruent words (long RT). It should be realized,
however, that this does not exclude the possibility
that the operation of automatic spreading-activa-
tion processes contributed to the RT effect as well
(by facilitating performance on congruent words).
Congruent Pseudoword Condition
The expectancy theory predicts that on most trials
in the congruent pseudoword condition, the
subjects were prepared for the pseudoword’s
‘base word’ in that the memory location of the
word the pseudoword was derived from was pre-
activated at the moment of stimulus presentation.
Since a congruent pseudoword was prepared by
changing only a single letter in the anticipated
word, a fast inspection of the stimulus’ overall
orthographic structure was sufficient in order for
the subjects to conclude that the target was
congruent, even though they were still ignorant
of whether the target was correctly spelled (and
actually required a ‘congruent’ response) or
incorrectly spelled (and required no response).
Presumably, being cognizant of the congruent
status of the target stimulus activated, or primed,
the hand to respond with. To perform the task
properly, subjects were required to postpone the
‘congruent’ response until all letters in the
stimulus were analyzed. Only then, they could
resolve on whether to actually execute (in case of
a word) or abort (in case of a pseudoword) the
response.
From the notion that subjects wasted little time
in establishing that the overall orthographic struc-
ture of the actual target matched the overall ortho-
graphic structure of the expected target, it follows
that they could turn all their attention to the nec-
essary letter-by-letter analysis shortly after the
presentation of the target stimulus. Moreover, the
subjects who discovered that the deviant letter
always occurred in the last part of the stimulus
may have adopted the strategy to first zoom in on
the final fragment of the target word they prepared
3It should be emphasized that the slow-acting expec-
tancy mechanism had time to operate only because we
employed a relatively long sentence-duration and a
relatively long time interval between the processing of
the sentence and the onset of the target word (see
Stanovich & West, 1979, 1981).
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themselves for. These subjects may have come
across the deviant letter in the congruent pseudo-
word even sooner. Both argumentations may
explain the finding that, in controls, slightly mis-
spelled congruent words induced a false alarm on
only 13% of the trials. Guessers, on the other
hand, misidentified a congruent pseudoword as a
word on 42% of the trials. This finding can be
taken to reflect an impaired ability to suppress the
‘congruent’ response until all letters in the stimu-
lus were analyzed.
The relatively long FA-RTs to congruent pseu-
dowords in controls and guessers suggest that
both subject groups were reluctant to reject a
congruent terminal word they prepared them-
selves for, even if they noticed a possible
‘deviancy’ in its spelling. Suppose, for example,
the pseudoword SPOOM was presented after JOHN
EATS HIS SOUP WITH A . . . . It is conceivable that the
dominant availability of SPOOM’s candidate
meaning (i.e., the meaning of SPOON) interfered
with, or slowed down, the judgment of the final
letter. The long FA-RTs support the idea that
subjects ‘double-checked’ the misspellings in
the expected congruent terminal words. In con-
trols, this extra check was of use since they
successfully rejected a congruent pseudoword
on the vast majority of trials. In guessers, on the
other hand, the extra spellings check was often
‘interrupted’ by the execution of the candidate
hand response, that is the hand response that was
activated by the availability of the meaning of the
word the pseudoword was derived from. The idea
that guessers were impaired in the ability to
inhibit this activation until they were sure of the
spelling of the word/pseudoword is supported by a
post hoc t test, indicating that the FA-RTs to
congruent pseudowords in guessers were signifi-
cantly faster than the FA-RTs to congruent pseu-
dowords in controls, t(30)¼ 0.74, p< .05.
Incongruent Pseudoword Condition
How does the expectancy theory account for the
finding that subjects produced more false alarms
in the incongruent pseudoword condition than in
the congruent pseudoword condition, and that,
unlike the FA-RTs to congruent pseudowords, the
FA-RTs to incongruent pseudowords were as fast
as the correct RTs to the words they were derived
from? The expectancy theory makes two predic-
tions. First, the limited-capacity processor started
off at the wrong location in the semantic memory
network in case of both an incongruent word and
incongruent pseudoword. Second, subjects could
not base a congruent/incongruent decision on a
shallow inspection of the overall orthographic
structure of the stimulus. In the congruent word/
pseudoword condition, the stimulus’ overall ortho-
graphic appearance immediately informed the
subjects that the actual target matched the ex-
pected target, and that, therefore, the target re-
quired a ‘congruent’ response unless it was
incorrectly spelled. In the incongruent word/
pseudoword condition, the overall orthographic
appearance did not give away the congruent/
incongruent status of the stimulus; it only in-
formed the subjects that the actual target did not
match the expected target. However, this did not
exclude the possibility that the target was a
congruent word (or pseudoword), albeit not the
one they prepared themselves for.
Thus, after having established that the overall
structure of the actual target differed from the
overall structure of the expected target, subjects
still needed to evaluate the incongruent pseudo-
word’s semantic content (congruent or incongru-
ent) and lexical status (word or pseudoword).
Since an incongruent pseudoword was prepared
by changing a single letter in an incongruent
word, a second look at the stimulus’ overall
orthographic structure biased the subjects towards
the incongruent pseudoword’s base word. How-
ever, in order for the subjects to retrieve the
meaning of the incongruent pseudoword’s base
word (and determine its semantic inappropriate-
ness), the conscious-attention mechanism first
needed to shift the limited-capacity processor
from the expected location in the semantic mem-
ory network to the location of the word the in-
congruent pseudoword was derived from. From
the congruent-incongruent effect on the RTs to
words, it can be inferred that such a ‘long-dis-
tance move’ in the memory network took up a
considerable amount of time. Correspondingly,
subjects needed more time to determine the
‘incongruent status’ of an incongruent pseudo-
word than the ‘congruent status’ of a congruent
pseudoword.
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Like the ‘congruent’ response in the congruent
pseudoword condition, it is assumed that the
‘incongruent’ response in the incongruent pseu-
doword condition became available before uncer-
tainty regarding the lexical status of the stimulus
was resolved (at least, on the majority of trials),
and that subjects needed to suspend the ‘incon-
gruent’ response until all letters in the stimulus
were analyzed. The FRR/FRT data indicate that
the subjects were careless in doing so. In controls
and guessers, incongruent pseudowords induced a
high false recognition rate, and in both reading
groups, the reaction times that accompanied the
false alarms were as short as the reaction times to
(correctly spelled) incongruent words. Together,
these data suggest that on a large number of trials
subjects neglected the letter-by-letter analysis of
the stimulus (necessary to make the word/pseudo-
word decision) after they had established its
‘incongruent status’. Apparently, subjects made
a ‘word’ decision as soon as the limited-capacity
processor arrived at the memory location of the
incongruent pseudoword’s base word and they
determined it’s semantic inappropriateness. It
can be argued that subjects were careless (i.e.,
fast and inaccurately) in making the subsequent
word/pseudoword decision because they realized
that they already wasted a lot of time in displacing
the limited-capacity processor in the semantic
memory network and making the congruent/
incongruent decision.
A more general version of this conception of
the speed-accuracy relationship has been ad-
vanced by the so-called deadline model of reac-
tion time (e.g., Ruthruff, 1996; Sanders & Rath,
1991). In short, this model assumes that subjects
who are engaged in a choice reaction task adopt a
time deadline and respond whenever processing
time passes this deadline. Since the processes that
preceded the final spelling check of the stimulus
took up more time in the incongruent word/
pseudoword condition than in the congruent
word/pseudoword condition, it is conceivable
that subjects experienced speed stress at the start
of the spelling check especially in the incongruent
word/pseudoword condition. In this condition,
subjects may therefore have speeded up the
necessary letter-by-letter analysis at the expense
of accuracy. At least, this would explain the
finding that incongruent pseudowords were
repeatedly misidentified as the words they were
derived from, as well as the finding that the FA-
RTs to the incongruent pseudowords were as fast
as the correct RTs to incongruent words.
Although both reading groups paid insufficient
attention to the lexical decision process in the
incongruent word/pseudoword condition, normal
readers were at least able to suppress the ‘incon-
gruent’ response on 60% of the trials. Guessers,
on the other hand, found substantially more diffi-
culty in suppressing the ‘go tendency’ triggered
by the overall orthographic structure of the incon-
gruent pseudowords, since they successfully
inhibited the ‘incongruent’ response on only
21% of the trials. On 79% of the trials, they
prematurely accepted an incongruent pseudoword
as the incongruent word it was derived from.
Guessers Versus Normal Readers
Thus, in both the congruent word/pseudoword
condition and incongruent word/pseudoword con-
dition, the poor performance of guessers can be
attributed to a less efficient suppression mechan-
ism, that is to an impaired ability to suppress an
‘congruent’ or ‘incongruent’ response until all
letters in the word stimulus were analyzed. The
conclusion that guessers tend to react prematurely
to (false) candidate words receives support from
the Van der Schoot et al. (submitted) study. In the
semantic categorization task, they found that
NoGo pseudowords induced substantially more
false word recognitions in guessers than in
controls.
Significantly, the pattern of FRR/FRT results
invalidates the hypothesis that in guessers, the
activation levels of the words’ logogens are over-
responsive to semantic context. This hypothesis
incorrectly predicted that, when compared to
controls, the performance of guessers would be
fast (i.e., fast RTs/FA-RTs) and inaccurate (i.e.,
high FRR) especially in the congruent word/
pseudoword condition. Contrary to this predic-
tion, the results showed that (in both subject
groups) congruent pseudowords produced less
false word recognitions than incongruent
pseudowords and that the group difference in
FRR and RT was as large in the incongruent
word/pseudoword condition as in the congruent
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word/pseudoword condition. Accordingly, we
have to conclude that the guessers’ high false
recognition rate on the SPT should be ascribed to
a less efficient suppression mechanism rather than
to excessive reliance on contextual information.
This leaves us with two questions: how can our
findings be integrated with the literature on
semantic cortical activation in dyslexic children
and why are guessers characterized by fast and
inaccurate on reading aloud tasks.
Studies using event-related brain potentials
(ERP) and magnetoencephalography (MEG)
have revealed a negative component with a peak
latency of about 400 ms after word presentation
(N400), which increases in amplitude with the
amount of unexpected semantic information a
word contains (Helenius, Salmelin, Service, &
Connolly, 1998, 1999; Marinkovic et al., 2003;
Osterhout & Holcomb, 1995). The N400 is gen-
erally viewed as reflecting a processor of seman-
tics in especially the left superior temporal cortex
(Brown & Hagoort, 1993; Helenius et al., 1998;
Holcomb, 1993). In sentential priming tasks,
dyslexic subjects have shown delayed N400
peak latencies (Brandeis, Vitacco, & Steinhausen,
1994) and smaller N400 amplitudes (Helenius
et al., 1999) when compared to control subjects.
Interestingly, dyslexic readers showed a weak
cortical activation especially to semantically
inappropriate sentence-ending words that began
with the same letters as the most expected word
(Helenius et al., 1999). This finding may well be
the electrophysiological manifestation of the ten-
dency to prematurely accept a correctly beginning
word (or, in our case, pseudoword) for the one
that is expected. Future research will be needed to
further examine this possibility.
Why do guessers read impulsively on reading
aloud tasks such as the AVI? Reading aloud tasks
require subjects to simply name words. That is,
they are required to compute the phonological
code of the words the text consisted of. Their
reading style can be explained by assuming that
there is a continuous flow of information from the
orthographic lexicon to the phonological lexicon
(i.e., by assuming that the partial activations of
words, and word units, in the orthographic lexicon
cascade forward to the corresponding phoneme
units in the phonological lexicon) and that, as a
consequence, a word may become available as a
vocal response before all of its sensory features
have been analyzed. Since such a ‘candidate
pronunciation’ might be wrong, the response
need to be stored in a response buffer (Coltheart
et al., 2001) until subjects are sure the correct
word would be read out. At present, we argue that
guessers find difficulty in doing so. That is,
guessers may read impulsively because they are
impaired in the ability to delay a vocal response
until all sensory features of a word are analyzed,
and the proper word can be read aloud.
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